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Introduction 
India represents an example of immense complexity and diversity in cultural 
production and communications. Broadcasting, film, newspaper, magazine, and 
musical production have been characterised by regional and linguistic diversity, 
with non-Hindi and non-English media in the private sphere especially showing 
signs of remarkable growth over the last decade or more (Jeffrey 1993). While the 
basic role of the state and state regulatory framework was established under British 
colonial rule, it has undergone substantial modification in the post-colonial period. 
In concert with many countries in the 'third world', private rather than state cultural 
and media production has become increasingly dominant to the extent that it 
challenges - strong central interventionist powers notwithstanding, both state 
production and regulatory frameworks. 
With the development of national broadcasting - television especially, through 
Doordarshan, and its increasing commercialisation as a result in particular of the 
success of 'soapies' such as Hum Log. and the Mahabharata and the Ramayan, the 
concerted questioning of the relationship between the state and Doordarshan 
gathered momentum. Pressures for the privatisation of electronic media have 
grown, while many within the mass media industries have expressed concern over 
the amount of control the state is able to exercise over production and editorial 
content. The long standing concern with, and struggle for J:?edia autonomy based 
on the BBC public service broadcasting model, has more recently and increasingly 
been linked with pressures for the privatisation of Doordarshan and an overall 
deregulation of the electronic media. 
Indian television, which was introduced as a limited service in 1959 as part of a 
UNESCO project, developed very slowly (Awasthy 1978: 208). It was given a low 
priority by the Indian government as it did not fit in well with national industrial 
and economic strategies and social objectives. The Indian electronics industry was in 
its incipient stage of development, there was an absence of broadband 
telecommunications links, and there was the concern on the part of AIR that its 'own 
corps of trained personnel should produce indigenous programming ' (Awasthy 
1978: 207; Bhatia et al 1984: 36). However by the early 1970s the situation had 
changed considerably as a result of the expansion of local production of television 
transmission and reception equipment, the setting-up of a television training 
institute, and the proposed introduction of nation-wide broadband microwave 
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linkages. After protracted debate, by 1972 the Indian government was committed to 
the expansion of television services based on the co-existence of a substantial 
earthbound network and a satellite system -INSAT (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 64-66). 
The expansion of television services occurred against a backdrop of debate about 
whether it was to be used for information, educational, or entertainment purposes, 
and whether it would drain scarce resources away from sound broadcasting which, 
despite its crucial role in communicating development programmes, still did not 
have a complete national coverage (Awasthy 1978: 208; Singhal & Rogers 1989: 71-
74). 
In the late 1960s, when Indira Gandhi was in charge of the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, expansion of television broadcasting was given much more 
serious consideration by the Government (Bhatia et al1984: 37). Thought was given 
to finding a way of creating an industrial infrastructure, possibly with foreign 
collaboration, able to engage in the indigenous manufacture of television 
broadcasting equipment. In 1971 collaborative arrangements were worked out 
between state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited and Fernseh (FRG) and NEC 
(Japan) for local production of studio and transmission equipment. 
Colour Transmission and the Doodarshan National Network 
The creation of a national television network in India is linked to the expansion of 
domestic electronics industries and the easing of restrictions on the importation of 
components and equipment, to the continued growth of consumer goods industries 
and national advertisers anxious to exploit large, essentially petty-bourgeois 
markets, and to the greater centralisation of state power. 
The Congress government's drive for the development of a national television 
network essentially coincided with the introduction of colour transmission. Central 
to the implementation of both was the televising of three international events in 
New Delhi in 1982-83. The most important of these events was the hosting and 
televising of the ASIAD Games in November-December 1982. The other two events 
of great importance were the hosting of the Seventh Conference of the Non-Aligned 
Nations Movement and the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Quite 
clearly the hosting of these events was seen by the Indian government as providing a 
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showcase for India's technological and organisational ability, as well as a means for 
gaining greater prestige in the international community (Pendakur 1991: 242). Rajiv 
Gandhi, the Prime Minister's son, was lll-ade chairman of the ASIAD Committee, 
with complete organisational responsibility for the event. While the successful 
hosting and televising of ASIAD, and the other two events, was important for 
international purposes, domestic considerations were not unimportant. Success 
would boost Congress's image, and enhance that of Rajiv Gandhi who was being 
groomed as Indira Gandhi's successor. Given the importance of television coverage 
to such domestic as well as international image-building, it was essential for 'the 
pomp and festivity of the games' to be seen by as many urban Indians as possible. 
The introduction of colour transmission provoked a great deal of debate. Strong 
advocates of its immediate introduction argued somewhat spuriously that it would 
have been impossible to provide international coverage of ASIAD without it; that is, 
colour transmission had to be provided for foreign broadcast organisations 
(Pendakur 1991: 243). Besides, black and white television was obsolete - as the 
introduction of colour television in countries such as Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and China 
clearly attested- and was n~t as convincing as colour in educational programmes. 
There can be little doubt that the introduction was linked to the rapidly growing 
importance of television as an entertainment and advertising medium for a large and 
expanding petty-bourgeoisie in particular which was increasingly attuned to the 
rhythm of expanded, repetitive consumption. Critics of the introduction of colour 
transmission argued that it was given much greater priority than a 'much needed 
national adult education program and a community health workers' program 
(which) were being scuttled' (Pendakur 1991: 243). 
The introduction of television on a national scale was linked to the launching of Insat 
1 (Pendakur 1991: 243). The initial daily transmission from New Delhi was to be for 
one and a half hours, with the principal programme categories being information, 
entertainment, and education. Clearly, as Pendakur (1991: 243) suggests, 'the 
intention was to create a wider audience for the pageantry and fanfare of ASIAD 
and other events in Delhi'. 
The development of an extensive national television network required very high 
levels of investment in infrastructural development. Predictably, after the initial 
introduction of television in Delhi, new transmitters were built in major 
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metropolitan centres such as Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Lucknow, Amritsar, 
Jalandhar, and Srinagar.i As a result, between 1973 and 1983 there was an eightfold 
increase in the number of television transmitters throughout India (Pendakur 1991: 
244). The significant increase in signal reach enabled a much greater percentage of 
the population to gain access to television. 
The substantial growth of television infrastructure was made possible largely 
through the sizeable funding allocations to broadcasting through successive 
development plans. Under the Fourth Plan there was a significant leap in 
expenditure on broadcasting. The allocation to broadcasting under the Fifth Plan 
(1974-1979) established the supremacy of television when the government more than 
doubled its allocation. The Sixth Plan further increased the amount to be spent on 
the expansion of television (Pendakur 1991: 245). 
The dramatic growth in the provision of a television infrastructure was matched by 
the rapid and sustained increase in the number of television receivers in the country 
(Tables 1 and 2). This was most pronounced between 1983 and 1985 when several 
factors combined to dramatically increase the number of receivers. Uppermost 
among them were government measures, including the liberalisation of import 
restrictions, relaxation of customs regulations, reduction of duties on imports, and a 
'special provision allowing relations of citizens living abroad to send television sets 
home'(Pendakur 1991: 245). During this period an estimated million television sets 
were imported. 
TABLE 1 
Growth in the Number of Television Sets and Audiences, 
1971-1985 
Year 
1971 
1973 
1975 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1988 
Source: Pendakur, 1991, p. 246. 
TV Sets 
0.004 
0.16 
0.45 
0.67 
1.1 
1.7 
2.8 
6.8 
27.00 
Audience (million) 
0.5 
1.7 
5.1 
8.5 
12.4 
16.4 
30.3 
60.00 
216.0 (estimated) 
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Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
* 
Indian Television 
TABLE2 
Production of Television Sets in India (Sets in Lakhs) 
1980-1990 
Black and White Colour Total 
Big Size Portable 
3.70 3.70 
4.35 4.35 
5.70 0.70 6.40 
6.60 0.50 7.10 
8.25 1.75 2.80 12.80 
13.60 4.50 6.85 24.85 
13.30 8.20 9.00 30.50 
14.00 17.00 12.00 43.00 
16.00 28.00 13.00 57.00 
41 * 11.50 52.50 
38.00 * 10.50 48.50 
Included in big size. 
Source: Sivasankar & Venkateswarulu, 1993, p.70. 
The remarkable growth in the number of television receivers was also the product of 
a more general easing, if not abandonment, of national policies concerned with the 
'fostering of indigenous research and development and production of television 
technology' (Pendakur 1991: 245). Relaxation of licensing regulation governing the 
manufacture of television sets allowed domestic manufacturers to import substantial 
numbers of television kits for assembly in India and to take advantage of using 
relatively low local labour costs. 
Although there was an enormous increase in the number of television receivers, and 
a much greater reach of the expanding national network, access to television was 
still severely restricted to the majority of the population by the basic cost factor. The 
generally low level of· wages for Indian workers has meant that for many - and 
certainly unskilled factory workers and agricultural labourers, both black and white, 
and colour sets, are well beyond their reach. In 1981, according to Pendakur (1991: 
246) a city typist would have to have set aside all of his/her annual earnings to 
purchase a relatively basic black and white television set. A colour television set 
would have required the annual earnings of a school teacher or skilled factory 
worker. 
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The successive substantial allocations to broadcasting in general, and television in 
particular, under national development plans has meant that the increasingly 
extensive television infrastructure, as well as that for telecommunications, has been 
largely funded through domestic savings based on the earnings of the Indian rural 
and urban labouring classes. Of course, they are precisely the classes which have 
least access to privatised television reception, and who are dependent to some extent 
on limited access through community sets. 
Television: The National Programme 
The introduction of the national programme on Indian television met with more 
regional opposition than support. It was essentially justified by the Indian 
government and broadcasting controllers in terms of its role in the promotion of 
national unity and promotion of understanding between different regions. Luthra 
(1986: 430) notes that 
The fare (of the National Programme) was to consist of 
news in Hindi and English, and programmes reflecting 
the music, dance and other aspects of life, literature and 
culture of all regions. 
Certainly the introduction of the national programme could be seen as part of the 
attempt by the Indira Gandhi administration to establish a stronger national 
presence in the regions at a time when their position was under considerable 
pressure. 
The regional objections to national programming, which were predictably strongest 
in Tamil Nadu, included, first, the claim that it represented the imposition of Hindi 
on non-Hindi states, second, the shift of the focus of production to Delhi to the 
detriment of production in other parts of the country, and third, the replacement of 
local prime time programming by the compulsory relay from Delhi. After 
opposition the relay of Hindi news by the Madras TV Centre was dropped from 
November 11 1982 (Luthra 1986: 430). It was only after discussions in Delhi in July 
1983 between Publicity Officials of all the states, and Ministers of Publicity and 
Information, that a revised national programme was agreed upon. The most 
significant revision, effective from September rs 1983, was the shift of the National 
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programme to the 9.00 to 10.30 p.m. time slot, thus leaving the prime time spot to 
local programming. 
Commercialisation of Doordarshan 
The commercialisation of Doordarshan basically began in 1976 when television 
services were separated from AIR and commercial spots were introduced. 
Advertising sponsorship followed in 1980. The pace of commercialisation has been 
encouraged, first, by the sharp increase in the number of television viewers since the 
mid-'70s, and second, since the mid '80s, by the success of locally produced soap 
operas- initially Hum Log, subsequently the Ramayan and the Mahabharata. As a 
result of commercialisation and the success of soap operas, there has been a sharp 
increase in annual revenues from advertising spots (a leap from US $0.6 million in 
1976 to $130 million in 1988), increases in advertising rates, and increases in 
Doordarshan's operating costs (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 79).ii (See Table 3) 
Undoubtedly the drive for the increased rate of commercialisation - indeed 
privatisation - of Doordarshan has come from some forces within the central 
government anxious to reduce its funding commitment (while enjoying the rapid 
increase in revenue from advertising and maintaining tight control over the 
organisation for political purposes), from transnational corporations, their Indian 
subsidiaries, and local companies interested in expanding their markets, and from 
programme producers. For Bombay film producers adversely affected by the 
expansion of television audiences and intense competition in the industry, there are 
definite advantages in producing programmes for Doordarshan: 'there is relatively 
less financial risk in producing television serials, as eager commercial sponsors are 
plentiful, and problems with box office sales, film distribution, and piracy do not 
exist' (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 83). 
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TABLE 3 
Doordarshan's Gross Revenues from Advertising, 1975-1988 
(in millions of dollars) 
Year 
.1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1987 
1988 
Gross Revenues 
0.65 
1.73 
4.14 
5.13 
6.73 
9.39 
13.25 
16.50 
26.19 
51.92 
90.66 
107.33 
Source:Pendakur, 1991, p.258. 
Corporate Power and the Commercialisation of Television 
The greatest drive for the rapid commercialisation of Indian television has 
undoubtedly come from the expanding corporate and industrial sectors of the 
economy. Despite uneven growth rates, throughout the late 1970s and 1980s 
capitalist industrialisation accelerated. By 1979 India had become the world's tenth 
largest producer of industrial commodities, and was ranked third behind the United 
States and Japan in its number of engineeers and scientists. The acceleration of 
capitalist industrialisation was manifested in higher national productivity, a 
substantial increase in the volume and value of commodities produced, and in the 
substantial growth of the number of licensed industrial enterprises. The accelerated 
industrialisation was also expressed in a much greater concentration of capital 
(while capital investment increased significantly, further concentration in the case of 
big business occurred), the growth of exports associated with transnationals in India, 
and in the development of an export orientation on the part of a number of major 
private and public sector companies. 
Capitalist industrialisation, and the rapid expansion of a highly differentiated 
consumer goods market on a national scale, has witnessed a corresponding growth 
in the financial services (this growth is reflected in the number of newspaper and 
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magazine advertisements for banks, insurance companies, and other financial 
institutions) and in advertising and market research industries. Increases in 
production and demand necessitated a much greater emphasis on the creation, 
identification, and management of demand through market research, advertising, 
and 'appropriate' media program(ming. A concomitant of this has been the growth 
over the last decade of often large-scale demographic and psycho-graphic studies of 
the Indian middle class (Pendakur 1991: 251). Not unexpectedly the Indian state has 
played a major part in this development with the commissioning of studies by the 
health, tourism, and finance ministries. While such specifically commissioned 
studies are obviously concerned with issues of policy formulation and 
implementation, they ·also represent part of the process whereby the state's 
informational role expands and the careful management of information and opinion 
takes effect. Pendakur (1991: 251-52) goes so far as to suggest there is a fusion in the 
expanded television and advertising industries of the need of the 'new regime (that 
is, the Rajiv Gandhi regime) to create and manage consensus and legitimate itself in 
a society that has been ripping at the edges for the last 40 years' and the need of the 
industrial capitalist to generate and expand a consumer culture. Ultimately, as 
Pendakur (1991: 252) notes, both the modern 'democratic' state and the owners and 
controllers of industry rely on the same technologies of opinion formation and 
market research to 'produce audiences/voters/ consumers'. Certainly the Rajiv 
Gandhi regime, which was closely identified with the acceleration of this 
development, increasingly resorted to such technologies, including the use of 
television and video campaigning, to boost and shore-up its position. 
The development of the modern nation-state can be read, Murdock (1993: 527) 
suggests, at least in part as a 'history of attempts to manage mass participation in the 
political process'. Constantly present has been a tension between 'two opposed 
rhetorical figures': on the one hand, the ideal citizen who is rational, 'open to 
sequential argument', and able to make considered personal choices and to soberly 
register political preferences; on the other hand, there is the figure of the crowd, 
which is essentially irrational, emotional, 'seduced by dramatic images, acting in 
concert, bargaining by riot and demonstration'. Since official discourse in 
democratic polities has been predicated on the advancement of the responsibilities of 
citizenship, it has generally denigrated the seduction of the crowd. The growth of 
consumerism, however, has posed a double-pronged problem for this discourse. 
First, consumerism has emphasised that consumption may provide personal 
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solutions for public difficulties. Second, consumerism tends to negate the appeals to 
the public good that underpin the rhetoric of citizenship. 
In India, as elsewhere, the tensions have been manifested in the history of public 
broadcasting as it has struggled to accommodate itself to the controlling imperatives 
of the state and the requirements of mass democracy (where the ruling party has 
attempted to control the construction and flow of political images and restrict access 
to oppositional parties) in a popular field which is dominated by the increasingly 
powerful forces of commercialised entertainment. Apart from trying to retain 
control over the public broadcasting apparatus, while making constant concessions 
and adjustments to the growth in power of private commercialised mass media and 
cultural industries, the ruling party and state managers have increasingly resorted to 
broadcasting and advertising as a means of shaping and controlling image and 
opinion formation and distribution. When Indian politics, certainly at the central 
level, were dominated by Congress the tensions were easier to contain. However, 
with the decline of Congress domination, Congress fragmentation, and the 
emergence of new parties or alliances of parties (Janata, Janata Dal) the tensions have 
become much more difficult to contain. The decline, and substantial popular 'loss of 
faith' in the dominant forms of representation, has been marked by the challenge to 
them of nationalistic, anti-secularist, sectarian, and fundamentalist forces. The 
response of a Congress party under electoral and ideological siege, was, beginning 
with Mrs Gandhi, to attempt to accommodate and mobilise these forces to its 
advantage, while trying to ensure that they did not become uncontrollable and a 
powerful means of mobilisation for oppositional parties. 
At the same time as the growing fragmentation and contradictions of the political 
field presented major problems for public broadcasting, increasingly powerful 
pressures have been directed at it by the rapidly expanding private sphere of 
communications and cultural production. The accelerated privatisation of cultural 
production, together with the proliferation of new communications distribution 
channels (satellite and cable television networks, VCRs), have fundamentally altered 
the relationship of public broadcasting to the development of consumer culture and 
capitalist forms of cultural production. Increasingly public broadcasting has become 
involved in a sharpening competition for 'core productive resources', creative 
labour, and intellectual property rights. The competition for audience time and 
allegiance has correspondingly greatly intensified. 
10 
Reeves Indian Television 
The growth and importance of the Indian advertising industry is borne out by basic 
statistical data. This industry, whose growth has been predicated on a combination 
of national and international capital, has also been marked by considerable 
indigenisation. Although transnational agencies and their affiliates still clearly 
dominate Indian advertising billings, they have been joined, if not challenged, by the 
proliferation of Indian agencies.ui The growth of indigenous capital in advertising is 
partly attributable to government restrictions on foreign ownership of Indian 
businesses. The 1974 Foreign Exchange Review Act required all businesses to have a 
majority Indian ownership. In addition, the Indian government, which has been a 
major advertiser, especially in the print media, has exclusively supported indigenous 
agencies. 
The growth of Indian agencies, above all, has been associated with the consistent 
expansion of the consumer goods sector throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
'liberalization' of state policies with regard to international capital has clearly 
provided opportunities for the more vigorous growth of transnational agencies, 
although it is also clear that the different regional concentrations of development 
contribute substantially to the emergence, and continued growth of, Indian agencies. 
The most prominent of these indigenous agencies has been the Ahmedabad-based 
Mudra Communications Ltd which has been tied to the Reliance Corporation. In the 
period from 1982 ( Rs 21 million) to 1992 (Rs 8832 million) Mudra Communications 
increased their gross billings by something like forty two fold. 
It is certainly clear that total billings, and the billings in the most important markets 
(principally the major cities such as Bombay and Delhi), have been dominated by the 
transnational agencies, with Mudra Communications occupying third place (Table 
4). 
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TABLE4 
Top 10 Indian Advertising Agencies by Gross Income 1991-1992 
Rank Name Gross Capitalised Growth over 
Income Billings Last Year(%) 
1 Hindustan Thompson 2465.27 16443.35 20.6 
Associates Ltd 
2 Lintas India Ltd 2205.64 14711.62 39.8 
3 Mudra Communicat- 1324.00 8832.00 7.6 
ions Ltd 
4 Ogilvy & Mather 1146.09 7644.43 9.7 
5 Ulka Advertising 964.00 6430.00 29.9 
6 Clarion Advertis- 705.00 4700.00 51.6 
ing Services Ltd 
7 R.K.Swamy /BBDO 617.00 4115.00 16.2 
Advertising Pvt Ltd 
8 Rediffusion Advert- 540.00 3600.00 20.8 
ising Pvt Ltd 
9 Trikaya Grey 529.16 3529.50 50.2 
Advertising Pvt Ltd 
10 Everest Advertising 491.00 3275.00 9.9 
Pvt Ltd 
Source: Advertising and Marketing, December 1992, p. 50. 
Throughout the 1970s there was a general increase in expenditure by advertisers 
across the different media (Table 5). The growth was highest in the case of cinema 
advertising at a time before the impact of television and video on audiences and 
advertising revenue was sharply felt. Cinema's share of advertising revenue 
decreased consistently throughout the 1980s, although the sharp reduction in total 
advertising revenue did not occur until after 1985. From the mid-1980s television 
advertising revenue increased dramatically while at the same time showing a steady 
growth in overall share of advertising revenue.iv (Table 5) 
The consuming public for expanding goods and services, and thus for 
advertisements, was composed initially of wealthier and propertied strata -
essentially the new petty bourgeoisie, and certainly not the poor and the landless. 
Increasingly this consuming public embrace$ higher income sections of the working 
class. Television has the important advantage over most other media of being able 
to effectively reach this clientele at relatively low cost, and especially through 
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entertainment-oriented programming. The development of the Doordarshan 
national programme, and more recently satellite television, has been crucial to the 
construction of national advertising and national consumer goods and services 
markets. 
Television, and advertising, clearly play an important role in the redefinition and 
reconstruction of the 'nation' and 'national culture'. Both emphasise the 
predominance of the commodity form in society and culture, that is, they stress the 
way in which the basic social relations of an Indian 'national' society are essentially 
constituted by the commodity form. India is progressively redefined as a nation of 
consumers. The citizen is redefined as a consumer. Aspects of Indian history, 
culture, tradition, and social relations are reworked in such a way that they become 
central to both the production and consumption of commodities, and a major way of 
legitimating symbolically particular forms of consumption. The intemationalisation 
of advertising, and especially the use of powerful international symbolic 
associations, is part of the process by which Indian national culture and society is 
redefined. It is important to recognise, of course, that the particular constructions of 
India which are developed through popular entertainment, and through advertising, 
are not necessarily shared by state policy makers, nor by the representatives of such 
powerful forces in Indian civil society as Hindu fundamentalism. 
The basic linkage of entertainment and advertising has been central to the drive for 
more television entertainment programming. This has posed a major dilemma for 
policy makers who are committed to the educational role of television while ever 
mindful of the revenue advantages to be gained from exploiting popular 
entertainment programming. The most substantial, and economically the most 
important, segments of the television public have no need for, or any interest in, 
educational and social responsibility-type programming, and feel resentful when it 
interferes with their viewing practices. 
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TABLE 5 
Expenditure by Advertisers by Media 1975-1987 
Year Press TV Radio Others* Cinema Total 
1975 550 70 120 71 811 
(67.8) (8.6) (14.8) (8.8) (100) 
1976 600 10 70 110 70 860 
(69.8) (1.2) (8.1) (12.8) (8.1) (100) 
1977 655 25 70 109 75 934 
(70.1) (2.7) (7.5) (11.7 (8.0) (100) 
1978 690 40 75 110 70 985 
(70.1) (4.1) (7.6) (11.2) (7.1) (100) 
1979 1180 61 85 121 78 1525 
(77.4) (4.0) (5.6) (7.9) (5.1) (100) 
1980 1460 90 120 160 130 1960 
(74.5) (4.6) (6.1) (8.2) (6.6) (100) 
1981 1910 110 150 180 140 2490 
(76.7) (4.4) (6.0) (7.2) (5.6) (100) 
1982 2330 160 150 200 150 2990 
(77.9) (5.4) (5.0) (6.7) (5.0) (100) 
1983 2980 200 180 220 170 3750 
(79.5) (5.3) (4.8) (5.9) (4.5) (100) 
1984 3210 280 190 250 190 4030 
(77.4) (6.9) (4.7) (6.2) (4.9) (100) 
1985 3330 500 200 270 180 4480 
(74.3) (11.2) (4.5) (6.0) (4.0) (100) 
1986 4500 1000 250 400 120 6270 
(71.7) (15.9) (4.0) (6.4) (1.9) (100) 
1987 5400 1360 280 450 120 7610 
(71.0) (17.9) (3.7) (5.9) (1.6) (100) 
* Principally billboard and transport advertising 
Source: Ramakrishna Rao, 1993, pp.lS-17. 
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Hindu Mythology and Popular Fictions 
Whereas soap operas had long been the most popular genre of television 
programming in Latin American countries, in India they did not appear on national 
television until1984. The first of such serials, Hum Log was a pro-development soap 
opera influenced by the Mexican model. After a lack of initial popular enthusiasm 
for the first episodes, and political criticism, a number of changes were made which 
increased its popular appeal. 
The family planning theme was diluted and themes 
such as the status of women, family harmony, and 
national integration became central to it (Singhal & 
Rogers 1989: 95). 
Hum Log's plot revolved around the joys and sorrows of a lower-middle class joint 
family, with a sub-story addressing political corruption and underworld activities. 
Masud (1985) notes that this setting had the advantage of securing a vast audience, 
while 'domestic or domesticated space is the perfect home for scenes of intimacy and 
confrontation'. 
Hum Log was followed by series such as Buniyaad (Foundation) and Khandaan. 
Shown in 1986-87, Buniyaad was a historical soap opera which dealt with India's 
partition primarily through the examination of the life and times of a four generation 
family. The saga focused on the tumultuous events following the partition with 
Pakistan. Some characters in common with the earlier Hum Log were clearly 
important in maintaining audience involvement and continuity. Khandaan is 
the rich man's Hum Log but is meant, like the latter, for 
the lower middle classes (as Dynasty, its original, is in 
America). However Hum Log, despite its gaucherie, has 
a certain innocence. Khandaan is all knowingness, 
contrivance and calculation (Masud 1985). 
Not unexpectedly many Indian popular 'fictions' are taken up with stories from 
Hindu mythology: from the puranas, and the two great epics, the Ramayan and the 
Mahabharata. This applies to feature film to a limited extent (Barnouw & 
Krishnaswamy 1980; Ramachandran 1985), to popular literature - especially comic 
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books (especially true of Indonesia as well), and increasingly to television series 
where the Ramayan and the Mahabharata have enjoyed astonishing popular success. 
Ramanand Sagar's Ramayan was shown by Doordarshan in 1987-88. Based on the 
religious epic, it attracted vast audiences (60 million on Sunday mornings) and 
substantial advertising revenue. The televised production of the epic, which 
celebrates Lord Rama's victory over the Demon King Ravana, stressed human 
values such as morality, obedience, discipline, and loyalty. While for many critics 
the series was a poor representation of the epic, for others it had the virtue of 
stressing values which would enable people to cope in a climate of often rapid 
economic and social change and moral uncertainty (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 70). The 
chaupaiyans (verses) of the epic 'were put to melodious music, each conveying a 
moral theme'. 
The popular success of Ramayan led to the production of another Indian epic serial, 
Mahabharata, which began broadcasting in late 1988. The strength and popularity 
of the series is seen by some commentators as residing in its 'contemporaneous 
flavour', its realism in the sense that it deals with conflicts immediately familiar to its 
audience - including the 'most common cause of family disputes - property', and 
above all, in the way in which 'every episode seems like a leaf taken out of the 
routine happenings in any ordinary Indian family'. 
Apart from the Ramayan and the Mahabharata, since the introduction of television 
soap operas, there has been a great diversity of setting and themes. Vijaya Mehta's 
Lifeline (Jeevan Rekha) provided a realistic portrayal of life in a hospital. Col. 
Kapoor's Fauji was a semi-factual, semi-fictional account of life in the army. Ketan 
Mehta's Mr. Yogi provided an initially irreverent take-off of the middle class and 
modern manners. Doctor Sahib dealt with a general practitioner with a heart of 
gold, while Murjim Haazir recreated turn-of-the century Bengali ambience. 
Doordarshan' s programming of serials has been regarded by its critics as always 
being with an eye to its political masters. One critic observed in 1989 that 
Perpetually scared of incurring the wrath of the 
political bosses, the DD mandarins played safe by 
blocking out all that could be interpreted as 
critical of the government, at the same time trying 
to please the authorities by airing programmes 
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that gave a boost to government objectives and 
policies (D'Silva 1989). 
Indian Television 
Boond Boond was dropped after it poked fun at village panchayats and its 
protagonist had some slight resemblance to the then opposition leader- later prime 
minister - V.P. Singh. The Indian answer to Britain's Yes Minister, Kakkaji Kahin 
was constantly butchered from the beginning. Storyline and dialogue were so 
extensively altered that 'ultimately, the Bhojpari-speaking political fixer named 
Kakkaji lost his identity and a promising satire was turned into a dull farce' (D'Silva 
1989). 
Masud (1985), writing at the beginning of the wave of Indian television soapies, 
considered sponsored television in India to be 'triumph of the middle class' -
certainly of middle class culture. Threatened by labour disorder, urban lawlessness 
and over-crowding, this class has had a 'panic stricken admiration of 'order' and 
'rationality', a fascination for the consumer culture exemplified in television 
advertisements which provide a type of structured order which ultimately 
contributes to their subordination, and the 'celebration of celebrity' in which 
politicians such as Rajiv Gandhi, and stars drawn from the film world, provide 
release for their fears and aspirations. The middle classes have provided the 
publicists and writers - the literati in general - who have produced the 'celebrity 
culture' and the hegemony for the ruling classes of the industrialists, ex-landlords, 
top politicians and senior state bureaucrats. 
Hindu Fundamentalism and the Televised Epics: Ramayan and 
Mahabharata 
The claim has constantly been made that the growth of Hindu fundamentalism has 
been fed, whether calculatingly or not, by the immense popularity achieved by the 
television series versions of first, the Ramayan, and second, the Mahabharata. S.T. 
Gill, the former Information and Broadcasting Secretary who initiated the serialised 
television adapatations of the epics, argued that the epics symbolised essential 
aspects of the 'Indian psyche' and provided a unifying symbol for the diverse 
groups within Indian society (Rajagopal1993: 108). 
After the success of Ramayan and the Mahabharata mythical-historical output 
became a high-rating standard tare on Doordarshan (Rajagopal 1993: 109). This 
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stood in sharp contrast to Indian feature film production which, while obviously 
exploiting myths central to Indian culture, had largely avoided the mythological 
epics. Faced with precarious financial returns from production (fewer than 15 per 
cent of films recouped their initial production costs) the Bombay film industry had 
not touched 'mythologicals' for many years (Rajagopal 1993: 108). As Das Gupta 
(1991: 165-66) suggests, the traditional mythological film has never formed the 
'favourite medium of the middle classes' and beat a retreat before the combined 
pressures of demands for freedom from foreign rule and freedom from the shackles 
of tradition. The overtly mythological film quietly retreated in the face of the post-
independence preoccupation with modernisation, industrialisation, and the 
dissemination of a scientific and 'secular' outlook. Popular film responded to the 
significant shift by mythologising the present, by 'creating new models of divine 
power invested in humans destined to protect traditional virtues'. 
In the case of television the constraints on innovative production and the exploration 
of new and different material, combined with intense competition among television 
writers, meant that few took chances: the emphasis was on the production of 
unobjectionable or the 'least objectionable programming' (Rajagopal 1993: 108). 
Given such constraints, state initiated innovation represented the only way of 
'breaking the mould'. 
The adaptation of the mythological form for television, although heavily indebted to 
Indian mythological film and Western representations, was nevertheless a significant 
innovation, albeit one to be seen very much in the context of acute and mounting 
problems facing the central state apparatus and the ruling Congress Party. Rajgopal 
(1993: 109) notes that the use in series such as Ramayan and the Mahabharata of 
'themes found in diverse folk traditions as well as in literature, with religious or 
historical characters' offered the possibility of a bridge between 'oral and classical 
traditions and between different regions'. That such programming coincided with, 
and indeed, may have been part of, attempts to mobilise votes along relgious lines, 
made it at least 'potentially inflammatory'. 
Some analysts (Sen Gupta 1991:2558) view the development of the television epics as 
part of the hegemonic project of a state under increasing fissiparous pressures whose 
legitimacy is questioned, if not challenged. Sen Gupta notes that 
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The intervention of the state to create a cultural 
discourse. wherein fascism may find much of its 
symbolic and effective power can be most clearly 
seen in its hegemonic control over the electronic 
media, particularly television. Despite the current 
enthusiasm over 'autonomy' dissent finds no 
place on television, it is perhaps naive under 
present circumstances to expect that to happen. 
(Sen Gupta 1991: 2558) 
Indian Television 
According to Sen Gupta, the controllers of state television, Doordarshan, basically 
colluded in the violent distortion of the 'original' texts of the Ramayan and the 
Mahabharata. They were prepared to set aside any evidence of a series such as the 
Ramayan contributing to an environment of Hindu fundamentalist politics out of 
sheer commercial considerations; after all, each episode of the Ramayan was earning 
Rs40 lakhs from advertisers. 
Indeed, Chatterji (1991: 209-211) questions whether the decision by the Indian 
government and Doordarshan to show the Ramayan and the Mahabharata was in 
breach of both the Constitution and the broadcasting codes of AIR and Doordarshan. 
The Supreme Court, in responding to a writ petition objecting to certain episodes of 
the Ramayan dealing with the banishment of Sita, appeared to adjudge the series a 
religious broadcast (Chatterji 1991: 213-14). The televised Ramayan and the 
Mahabharata certainly exposed the fine line between religion and culture in a 
country where culture is so bound up with Hinduism - and Islam for that matter 
(Smith 1963: Ch.3). State or government encouragement of culture 'may amount to 
the propagation of Hindu culture and Hindu religion' (Chatterji 1991: 211). 
In the aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya the Indian Union 
Government and Doordarshan rejected Krishna, another expensively produced 
mythological series by Ramanand Sagar who was responsible for the Ramayan. 
Initially the decision to reject Krishna appeared a trifle odd given the problems 
Doordarshan was suffering from a major dearth of popular serials, and damaging 
competition from the satellite television channels. The rationale for the Doordarshan 
decision to reject the series was provided by the Union minister Krishna Kant Sahay 
who claimed that the series could have been used by the BJP to 'arouse communal 
passions' (Shifa Maitra 1993: 31). According to Maitra's report, the minister 'felt that 
earlier, too, the BJP had used the serial Ramayan to increase its own power and 
hence the ruling party was very wary of putting Krishna on the national network'. 
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In the aftermath of the Ram Janambhoomi issue and widespread violence, a series 
dealing with Krishna would at least have had the potential to contribute to renewed 
frenzy - especially when the the construction of Hindu temples at Kashi and 
Mathura is on the BJP's and Hindu Parishad's agenda. Despite central gov1ernment 
and Doordarshan rejection, Krishna has found illegal transmission outlets through 
local cable operators as well as through a number of international networks. Maitra 
notes that 
Another gimmick adopted to popularise the serial 
is the introduction of Krishna vans which tour the 
Hindi belts of India showing the serial to the 
masses free of cost. At the Kumbli mela at 
Hardwar and Ujjain, the masses are said to have 
"loved" the serial. 
(Maitra 1993: 31) 
The television serialisation of the Ramayan and the Mahabharata brought to the fore 
the whole issue of the struggle for both the control over the means of cultural 
production and control over content (Rudolph 1992). The mega-serials, according to 
Rudolph (1992: 1494), first sought to interpret the epics in ways which were relevant 
to contemporary Indian society. Other commentators have suggested this, pointing 
to the way in which the serials, and certainly parts of the Mahabharata, could be 
construed as criticising state and ruling party abuse of power and calling them to 
moral account in terms of precepts which are central to the epic tradition. Initially, 
some observers even suggested that Draupadi was used in the Mahabharata to 
'articulate feminist sentiment' (Rudolph 1992: 1494). Second, the televised epics have 
contributed to the increased standardisation of the epics, with the great diversity of 
local and regional versions at risk of giving way to a national one. Third, Rudolph 
notes, the televised epics have contributed to the creation of a 'national Hindu 
identity', that is, to a 'form of group consciousness that has not hitherto existed'. 
The serialised television productions of the epics, through their shallowness of 
treatment of characters, absence of psychological introspection, praying on simple 
sentiment, and striving for some contemporary relevance, do not represent such a 
dramatic departure from the adaptations of language and interpretation made by 
touring and local companies for village and town performances. The epics have 
never represented final text 'museum pieces' but rather texts readily adaptable to 
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changing circumstances (Lutgendorf 1990: Lutgendorf 1991). This is the substance of 
Janaky's criticism of Sen Gupta, which, while accepting the centrality of his claim 
that the televised epics have been an important part of the growth of Hindu 
fundamentalist consciousness, nevertheless hinges on the status of the Mahabharata 
in particular as a text. Janaky (1992) notes that the Mahabharata is a text which has 
undergone a great many contradictory and dissenting constructions throughout its 
life. There is as such no original text which is unambiguous in meaning and which 
can be used to measure the distortion, manipulation, and falsehoods produced in the 
television versions. Janaky (1992), like Lutgendorf (1990:1991), suggests that analysis 
of the two epics should proceed, not on the basis of some original or authentic text 
which has a fixed and unambiguous meaning, but rather on the recognition of two 
texts which have been constructed, whether intentionally or not, in ways which 
contribute to popular forms of Hindu fundamentalist consciousness. However there 
is, as Rudolph (1992: 1494) observes, a significant difference between previous, often 
localised adaptations of texts such as the Ramayan and the Mahabharata to changing 
circumstances, and their adaptation, through television production and distribution, 
to the 'arena of public culture where values, metaphors and preoccupations can be 
standardised for national public consumption'. 
Amrita Chhachi (1989: 570) uses as an example of the highly selective, careful 
contemporary construction of a Hinduism that requires no 'textual or historical 
verification' the way in which Sita is depicted in Sagar's televised Ramayan. Sagar, 
when interviewed about his series, quite frankly admitted that in the period when 
the Ramayan was set, women did not cover their torsos. However, in order for him 
to convey the image of Sita as the 'pure, chaste and ideal wife' it was necessary for 
her to wear a blouse - nudity would have 'violated the moral message of the serial. 
Das Gupta (1991: 167) observes as an 'ironical fact' that the form of the mythological 
film in Indian cinema is 'directly derived from the West' and has little if anything to 
do with Indian art. The visual culture of the Ramayan, like that of all the Indian film 
mythologicals, is directly indebted to the forms developed by the much villified Ravi 
Varma in his late nineteenth century, heavily academic treatment of Indian gods and 
goddesses." Das Gupta (1991: 169) accuses Sagar of exploiting a cheap sexuality -
'Sagar is trying to extract all the commercial juice he can out of a sexy situation' -in 
which there is a contradiction between the spoken language and the non-verbal. 
Indeed, the non-verbal is characteristically marginalised in popular cinema and 
television. Das Gupta illustrates this point by referring to the following. 
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In the scene where Kaikeyi obtains her boons, she 
has slinky hair falling over her shoulders, her face 
made up, with heavy eyeshadow. Kaikeyi's body 
language, the way she stands, the way she pouts 
her lips, her coquettish arrogance before Rama, all 
indicate a vulgar sexual hold on an aging 
monarch which the words strenuously deny. 
(Das Gupta 1991: 169) 
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Much of the consternation about the contribution of the Ramayan and the 
Mahabharata to Hindu fundamentalism has focused on issues of sexual politics and 
the representation of women. For Sen Gupta the television epics provided material 
for a 'popular culture of Hindu fascism'. The epics were 
faithful to the gender bias of sources of their 
ideological inspiration. This gender bias 
manifested itself in two ways - one, a complete 
brushing away of aspects of female or male 
sexuality wherever it proves to be uncomfortable 
with a masculinist, heterosexual and puritanical 
world view. Secondly, the complete and total 
subversion of of any dissenting voice within the 
female characters, be it Gandhari's lament or 
Sita' s anger or even the agony of someone as 
rebellious. as Draupadi. 
(Sen Gupta 1991: 2559) 
Central to Indian feminist concerns has been the challenge to patriarchal forms of 
authority and control which are emphasised in Hindu fundamentalist thought. This 
challenge has involved, first, exposing and agitating against the more obvious and 
extreme manifestations of women's subordination and oppression -dowry murders, 
police rape, sati, and the abortion of female foetuses after amniocentesis (Chhachhi 
1989: 573). This has been done very much in terms of the argument developed by 
the early twentieth century social reform movement in condemnation of social ills· 
and injustice - and thus as a way of mobilising wider public support. Second, the 
challenge, as Chhachhi (1989: 573) notes, has taken the less publicised form of 
establishing the connection between the more extreme manifestations of women's 
oppression, such as dowry murders, and the structural violence which is 
fundamental to the existing patriarchal family system. 
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Patriarchal structures of authority have been under threat, not just simply from the 
women's movement and women's agitation, but more fundamentally from the 
demands of the capitalist labour market. The contradictions thrown up by this have 
led to attempts, including violent ones, to 'reassert control and reimpose systems of 
domination' (Chhachhi 1989: 573). Hindu communalism and fundamentalism, with 
its strong emphasis on masculine identity, military prowess, and forms of 
disciplined, para-military style organisation, is central to this. Chhachhi (1989: 575) 
notes that 'almost always' the call for a return to culture and tradition, which is at 
the crux of fundamentalist rhetoric, is addressed to women. Women are 'neither 
acknowledged or allowed to be producers of theology, although they are the main 
practitioners of religion and hence the reproducers of culture and tradition'. 
Sen Gupta (1991: 2559) argues that in the Ramayan and the Mahabharata the 
assertion of female identity and sexuality is either completely ignored or seen as 
'dangerous' and 'castrating'. Where there is the possibility of bisexuality in 
particular characters, or a real ambiguity regarding their sexual identity, it is again 
either seen as a curse or completely ignored. 
According to Sen Gupta (1991) the essentially rambling and encyclopedic nature of 
the Mahabharata in particular, and the Ramayan to a lesser extent ('far more 
cohesive in terms of structure and plot'), promoted multiple and contradictory 
'readings' of the texts. The very nature of the Mahabharata was such that it allowed 
spaces for both elitist and subaltern voices, for 'voices of rebellious, angry women 
and voices of powerful patriarchs'. Although over time 'the elitist voice came to 
predominate' the subaltern voices could not be stifled: 'theirs was a subdued but 
persistent chorus that renewed itself with each reinterpretation' (Sen Gupta 1991: 
2558). However, according to Sen Gupta, the televised interpretation of the epics 
was such that the contradictory strain which was so much a part of the epic tradition 
was negated. This construction, which may be seen as part of the very selective 
construction of tradition in accordance with the requirements of a 'fascist' culture, 
was part of the hegemonic control exercised over the electronic media. 
The televised epics, Sen Gupta contends, contributed to the new cult of male gods 
(the establishment of a holy tri:qity of Ram, Krishna, and Shivat and to the much 
greater marginalisation of the mother goddess which was 'very much the stuff out of 
which popular Hinduism was constructed from the late 60s onwards' (Sen Gupta 
1991: 2559). The mata cult, like other popular forms of Hindu expression, was 
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generally associated with the pre-Aryan, non-Brahminical 'little tradition' of 
Hinduism. According to Sen Gupta (1991: 2559) 'a new Hindu identity that 
deliberately highlighted its "Brahminical"/"Aryan" accents could not afford to allow 
undue prominence to the mother goddess'. 
Doordarshan - The Issue of Autonomy 
In the late 1980s the commercialisation of Doordarshan and AIR had reached the 
stage where proposals for greater autonomy were being advanced and a bill 
introduced in the Lok Sabha. Many critics were somewhat sceptical of the meaning 
of the proposed autonomy. Under the Rajiv Gandhi administration the electronic 
media were used for party propaganda purposes (Singh 1990); the distinction 
between party and government at times was a blurred one. Shortly before the end of 
his administration a number of news programmes tested the limits of new found 
freedom. In the Prasar Bharat bill a two-tier structure for Doordarshan was 
introduced which consisted of a board of governors and a watchdog broadcasting 
council. Financial control remains vested in government which retains the right to 
issue directives to make or prevent any broadcast 'in the interests of security of the 
state or preservation of public order' or 'on any matter of public importance'. The 
government resisted pressures to go further along the privatisation route by 
invoking familiar arguments about problems of development, unity and national 
order, as well as the dangerous promotion of a consumer ethos which cannot be 
sustained by current production levels and uneven distribution. According to Singh 
(1990), however, the major obstacle to greater autonomy for the electronic media, 
and privatisation, is that 'whatever the party in power, control of the electronic 
media is too valuable a weapon to give away'. 
The BBC model of autonomy has exerted considerable influence over Indian policy-
makers for several decades. As early as 1948 Nehru upheld it as the model for 
Indian broadcasting, although he argued that at the time, given the peculiarities of 
Indian conditions, there could be no more than a 'semi-autononmy'. Broadcasting 
became a department of state. The influence of the BBC model was clearly evident 
in the recommendations of the Chanda Committee (1966) and the Verghese Working 
Group (1978). 
The BBC model of autonomy has involved, first, freedom from governmental 
control, and second, an autonomy from control by parliament (Chatterji 1991: 203-
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204). The first, despite ultimate control by government, has involved a means of 
financial independence and the maintenance of objectivity in the presentation of 
news, current affairs, and other programmes. The media, in other words, should not 
be biased in favour of the government. The second has involved a means of 
budgetary independence. 
During the 1989 general elections to the Lok Sabha all parties included in their 
manifestos a promise to grant autonomy to the electronic media (Chatterji 1991: 203). 
The Janata Dal manifesto promised that within a year of election to office it would 
establish autonomous corporations for radio and television under a parliamentary 
charter. The newly autonomous organisations would be supervised by an 
independent board of governors. The BJP also pledged itself to the autonomy of 
radio and television, while simultaneously raising the possibility of having separate 
channels for the states (Rudolph 1992: 1491-92). However Congress I's relatively 
weak commitment to media autonomy was largely couched in terms of the 
'functional autonomy' Doordarshan was supposed to enjoy under the Rajiv Gandhi 
administration. The Congress-I's manifesto's commitment to 'functional autonomy' 
was essentially a renewal of the 'pledge that AIR and DD would be free to be 
objective and fair even while remaining under the financial, personnel and, 
ultimately, political, tutelage of the information and broadcasting ministry' 
(Rudolph 1992:1493). When set against the backdrop of 'Rajivdarshan' and constant 
intervention in the electronic media, the pledge lacked some credibility. 
The National Front Government of V. P. Singh introduced a new Prasar Bharat 
(Indian Broadcasting Bill) soon after being sworn in on December 2, 1989. The bill 
was to be debated and passed in May 1990 after parliament reconvened in March for 
its budget session. At its first reading, however, 'numerous basic changes were 
introduced, thus robbing the act of being a charter of freedom for AIR and 
Doordarshan (Chatterji 1991: 203). 
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The Challenge of Satellite Television 
Strong pressures for greater media autonomy and privatisation long preceded the 
rapid introduction of private satellite television. However, it was the speed at which 
satellite television was introduced, its immediate success with the most lucrative 
segments of the advertising market, and its rapid encroachment upon areas of highly 
successful Doordarshan programming, which intensified the crisis within 
Doordarshan and exposed national communications policy as in a state of disarray. 
Clearly the central Indian government, through the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, and Doordarshan, could effectively contain pressures for privatisation 
and autonomy while the central preoccupation was with terrestrially-based 
electronic media. The introduction of satellite television, through STAR TV (with its 
c'c 
many channels) presented a challenge which could not simply be dealt with through 
the usual bureaucratic form of control and political intervention. 
The initial entry of STAR TV in the satellite television market provided them with an 
advantage, not just simply in terms of programming and the ability to tap the most 
influential audience and advertising segments, but in the basic channels of 
communication. STAR TV seized a substantial advantage over Doordarshan by 
effectively tying-up the distribution system. 
Today, most of the dish antennae in the country 
are so installed as to receive only programmes 
beamed by STAR TV. And the five parallel STAR 
signals coming from Asiasat plus the two to three 
inter-film channels provided by local cable-TV 
operators - through whose networks satellite 
television programmes are largely disseminated-
take up almost the entire capacity of the existing 
distribution system. 
(Chaudhury 1993: 12) 
Doordarshan, relying on terrestrial transmission, was disadvantaged by its viewers 
having to disconnect the cable-TV line to switch to Doordarshan. The use of Insat 
for the transmission of the Metro Channel represented the first serious step on the 
part of the Indian government to fight the competition from STAR TV and the other 
satellite television operators. 
26 
Reeves Indian Television 
At the time STAR TV first began its transmission to India there was apparently little 
Doordarshan management concern about the threat it posed to existing electronic 
media interests. "u The sheer size of Doordarshan with its large staff (many actually 
only employed on a contractual basis), 'sprawling countryside networks', diversity 
of governmental contacts that could be translated into advertising revenue, and 
massive popular success of series such as the Mahabharata and Tipu Sultan, seemed 
to render it immune from the type of challenge represented by STAR-TV. The 
popularity of STAR-TV programmes such as The Bold and the Beautiful, Santa 
Barbara, and Real Value, attracted the sponsorship of the Godrej Group. 
Doordarshan and government officials, however, felt that the language factor would 
provide an effective barrier against a major increase in market share. The launching 
of the Hindi channel, ZEE TV, quickly removed this barrier so that the Indian 
government and Doordarshan were presented with a major problem. Zee TV very 
quickly attracted major advertisers: 'starting with a mere 23 advertisers in December 
1992, Zee TV had attracted 85 advertisers by the end of March this year' (Chaudhary 
1993: 11). 
Indian government responses to the introduction of private satellite television and 
private cable television systems, and the pressure for a more thoroughgoing 
privatisation of Doordarshan have assumed a predictable form. The rhetoric of 
response has been dominated by the concern to protect national integrity and 
security from anti-national propaganda (the Pakistan factor is important here), and 
to promote advertising which promotes the consumer ethos and 'elitism'. For 
example, the Inter-Departmental Committee which was set up by the government in 
June 1989 to consider the policy implications, and the adequacy of existing laws 
relating to the growth of cable television networks and the dish antennae system, 
couched its concern very much in these terms.viu The committee, however, while 
expressing concern about the impact of foreign programming, suggested that the 
only effective long-term way of counteracting such influence was through the 
development of better and more competitive Doordarshan programming.ix This 
partly reflects the sheer difficulty of effectively controlling and licensing household 
cable television networks and satellite dishes.x 
Faced with the mounting competition from the satellite television channels, 
declining audiences (of major importance given the impact on advertising revenue), 
and increasingly shrill criticism, especially from private television and film interests, 
the Doordarshan management and the Indian government responded by first, 
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announcing the up-linking of the four metro channels to the Insat lA and 2A 
satellites (from April 1 1993), and second, by the phased opening of three more 
channels that would cater for the diverse interests and 'needs' of the country. In 
addition to the national network and the metro channel, the other channels proposed 
were one each for Entertainment and Cultural Activities, Sports, Current Affairs, 
News, and Financial Matters. Undoubtedly the linking of the metro channels to the 
satellite system, and the opening of new channels with specific market interests, will 
give a considerable spur to local television production, which, prior to the 
introduction of private satellite television, has been 'hamstrung' by the 'paucity of of 
enough cost-effective channels of telecast' (Sinha 1993: 23). 
The announced changes met with a mixed reaction from Indian film and television 
interests which had been closely identified with the drive for the privatisation of 
Doordarshan. Although the new channels are to cater substantially to private 
television production companies, this is to be achieved without any real 
relinquishment of control by Doordarshan. 
The TV industry has, of course, not received the 
Minister's decision very happily. If anything, 
they are incensed because instead of going ahead 
with their oft-repeated promise of privatisation, 
the I & B Ministry has rather cunningly tried to 
retain its hold over the electronic media. Despite 
their assertion that commercial time would be 
sold to private agencies, the ministry's decision 
reflects the reluctance of the power-hungry 
brokers at letting this important lever of power 
and moolah go out of their hand 
(Sinha 1993: 23). 
Doordarshan management's decision to sell time slots on the proposed new metro 
channels on a first-come-first-served basis quickly descended to the level of farce. 
After putting price tags on the different slots, depending on the channel and the 
time, Doordarshan set no other conditions. At least ten days before the applications 
were to be received long queues of applicants (or at least their stand-ins) had begun 
to form outside Doordarshan's Metro Channel offices at Tolstoy Margin New Delhi. 
Some of those queueing represented major television production interests (Pronnoy 
Roy's NDTV, for example) while others were completely unknown quantities. Faced 
with growing chaos some applicants petitioned the Delhi High Court to have the 
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queueing declared illegal. Attempting to address the chaos after an initial delay, 
Doordarshan' s selection criteria underwent an abrupt change from the first-come-
first-served principle to selection on the basis of computer 'random number 
generation' (Suroor 1993: 9). 
Pronnoy Roy's NDTV, which was orginally first in line, went to the High Court after 
the abandonment of the first selection procedure. The Delhi-based North India Film 
Association challenged both selection principles. On July 15 the Delhi High Court 
stayed the Doordarshan selection scheme.'i In a later, detailed judgement the Delhi 
High Court set aside both the 'first come first served' and 'random number 
generation' schemes. While accepting six petitions challenging the validity of the 
first principle of selection, the court dismissed the petition by Home Communication 
Network, which had been initially successful, for its retention:u Interestingly the 
Delhi High Court in its judgement upheld the contention of the government counsel 
that any choice based on past performance had the tendency to create monopolies 
and to inhibit new entrants. This went against the submissions of major, proven 
television and film production companies, as well as against the position of the Air 
Time Committee which had been set up by the Prime Minister's Office and not by 
the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The Air Time Committee, chaired by 
P.S. Deodhar, had opposed the selling to early arrivals of the time slots and was 
concerned that the professional background of the applicant was at the least the 
starting point in the selection process: 'applicants should have proven track records 
in producing television/radio programmes, feature films, video film, video 
magazines, documentaries etc'. The Information and Broadcasting Ministry's 
decision to ignore the recommendations of the Air Time Committee was 
undoubtedly partly bound up with resentment at having their powers usurped by 
the Prime Minister's Office, as well as with special arrangements which had been 
worked out with new applicants. 
Indian television reveals a good many of the major contradictions of state, economy, 
and society. Many within the Congress- I governments' of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi 
could see immense advantages in using television in particular to mobilise mass 
political support through popular programming and the careful construction of 
powerful images at a ·time of growing political fragmentation and Congress - I 
electoral weakness. The Ramayan and the Mahabharata were produced and shown 
at at time when issues of Hindu identity and communal consciousness were 
increasingly important as mobilising forces, and could be seen as part of the 
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response of significant sections of the Hindu upper castes to the apparent threat to 
their position by middle and lower castes who rejected their status in the Hindu 
varna order and in modern Indian society (Balachandran, 1993). While initially 
working for Congress, the mobilisation of such forces, including the immensely 
popular televised epics, ultimately, and at least in the short term, served the interests 
of the aggressively Hindu BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and Hindu fundamentalist 
organisations such as the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and the VHP 
(Vishwa Hindu Parishad). At the same time the increased 'liberalisation' of the 
Indian economy, with its substantial easing of restrictions on trade and investment, 
and basic shifts in communications policies, exposed major contradicitions in the 
state, many of whose managers wanted the benefits of sustained economic growth 
and the rapid expansion of consumerism without relinquishing often direct forms of 
political and bureaucratic control over programming and the construction and 
dissemination of news. 
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The transmitters were built in India, partly by private companies, and 
partly by state-owned enterprises. 
Singhal & Rogers (1989: 75-80) note that the successful commercialisation of 
Doordarshan has provoked often intense debate about television's role in 
Indian society, including its role in the promotion of consumerism, 
competition between consumer goods manufacturers, and in exacerbating 
inequalities. 
Each year the A & M (Advertising and Marketing) magazine provides a 
detailed report on the performance of India's top advertising agencies. These 
reports provide a good guide to the extent of the development of local 
agencies and their principal markets. 
Advertising revenue for the print media, assisted greatly by the continued 
expansion of the vernacular language press, continued to show steady 
increase throughout the 1980s. However its share in relative terms showed a 
steady, if slight, decrease. 
Tapati Guha-Thakurta, in her The Making of a New 'Indian' Art: Artists, 
aesthetics and nationalism in BengaL c. 1850-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) provides a most critical account of Ravi Varma's work. 
This is expressed very directly in the immediate Hindutva programme of the 
'liberation' of temples at Ayodhya Mathura, and Benares (Varanasi). 
Towards the end of 1991, STAR TV, then a little-known Hong Kong company, 
acquired a satellite transponder and began beaming a 'heady mixture' of 
shows to the Indian sub-continent. 
This is an expression of a deeper paradox. Both Doordarshan and AIR, 
through increasing reliance on revenue generated through popular 
programming and advertising, have contributed directly to the dominance of 
the commodity form in Indian society and to the development of a consumer 
culture. This has included the expansion of the market for electronic goods 
(television sets, VCRs, radios, as well as software). The reservation, if not 
opposition on these grounds, sits rather uneasily with, first, the trade and 
investment liberalisation policies of the late 1980s, and second, with the extent 
of the development of the consumer goods industries and the massive growth 
of consumerism. 
'Panel against ban on cable television networks', 
The Hindu (International Edition), 2 March 1993, p. 7. 
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The widespread introduction of cable television networks posed some 
difficulty for the Inter-Departmental Committee. During the early 1990s the 
household penetration of cable television increased consistently in New Delhi, 
Bombay- where it was introduced much earlier, Madras, and more slowly in 
Calcutta. One 1991 estimate put the number of people hooked into the cable 
television networks at 50 lakhs (5 million) ('Carry on Cable', The Times of 
India, 31 October 1991). 
The rapid expansion of cable television networks has been at times vigorously 
opposed by film producers and production personnel, by film distributors 
and exhibitors, and by video shop proprietors. This occurred in Madras in 
February 1991 when a range of protests and legal actions were engaged in by 
different sections of the Tamil Nadu film industry. Film industry 
representatives argued that the industry was a major employer, generated 
very substantial revenue for both the central and state governments through 
entertainment tax, and was thus deserving of greater state support and 
protection. The use of videos through private household cable television 
networks breached copyright, evaded entertainment tax, and took income 
away from the film industry through either the use of foreign film material or 
locally produced-and possibly pirated, videos which could service a great 
many households ('Film industry protests against cable TV', The Hindu 
(International Edition), Vol.17, No.9, 2 March 1991). 
'Court stays DD scheme on time slots', The Hindu (International Edition), 24 
July 1993, p. 13. 
'Doordarshan's time slot schemes set aside', The Hindu (International 
Edition), 2 October 1993, p.4. 
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